REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AS A TOOL FOR SHADOWING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: IN SEARCH OF A BALANCE BETWEEN JURISDICTIONAL CONVERGENCE AND COMPETITION ON INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31891/mdes/2022-6-24Keywords:
shadowization, offshorization, regulatory arbitrage, global economy, banking sector, taxes, competition, regulation, international capital flowsAbstract
The reaction of business entities to changes in the regulatory environment transforms the perception of risk as such in an unforeseen way, which, in fact, complicates the forecasting of the impact of the regulatory environment on the performance of economic agents, not only in the long term, but also in the short term. At the same time, regulatory norms that achieve their goals (financial stability, consumer protection, transparency of banking activities, growth of tax revenues to the budget, etc.) can be revised or withdrawn as soon as the conditions for the reproduction of the economic system change. It has been established that subjects and individuals falling under the new rules of interaction tend to adapt their business models and behavior in response to updated regulatory norms, which can help slow down the processes of de-shadowization of the economy in the event that there is an outflow of capital or labor resources in jurisdictions that implement strategies "races to the bottom” will have a devastating impact on the development of the national economies of countries whose governments have committed themselves to harmonizing their regulatory environment, taking into account the rules of cooperation defined at the supranational level of regulation of international economic policy.
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